SINGLE-DESK SELLING OF CANADIAN BARLEY: PRICE POOLING, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, AND SYSTEMIC COSTS by Johnson, D. Demcey
   Agricultural Economics Report No. 411 January 1999
   Single-Desk Selling of Canadian Barley:
   Price Pooling, Price Discrimination,
   and Systemic Costs
   D. Demcey Johnson
  
Department of Agricultural Economics ! ! Agricultural Experiment Station
North Dakota State University ! ! Fargo, ND  58105-5636Acknowledgments
Thanks are due to Won Koo, William Nganje, John Mittleider, and William Wilson for
constructive comments and to Carol Jensen for preparing the manuscript.  All remaining errors
are the author’s responsibility.  Funding for this research was obtained from the North Dakota
Barley Council, and through a cooperative agreement with the Economic Research Service of
USDA, entitled “Government Intervention in the Canadian Barley Sector and Its Influence on
Trade,” #43-3AEK-8-80036. 
We would be happy to provide a single copy of this publication free of charge.  You can
address your inquiry to: Carol Jensen, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota
State University, P.O. Box 5636, Fargo, ND, 58105-5636, Ph. 701-231-7441, Fax 701-231-7400,
e-mail cjensen@ndsuext.nodak.edu .  This publication is also available electronically at this web
site:  http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/ndsu.html 
NOTICE:
The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author.  They are not necessarily
endorsed by the Department of Agricultural Economics or by North Dakota State University.
North Dakota State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to
its programs, and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation.
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from:  Department of Agricultural
Economics, North Dakota State University, P.O. Box 5636, Fargo, ND 58105.  Telephone: 701-231-7441,
Fax: 701-231-7400, or e-mail: cjensen@ndsuext.nodak.edu.
Copyright © 1999 by D. Demcey Johnson.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice
appears on all such copies.Table of Contents
Page
List of Tables ...............................................................ii
List of Figures ............................................................. iii
Abstract .................................................................. iv
Executive Summary ..........................................................v
1.  Introduction .............................................................1
2.  Background on Canada’s Barley Sector ........................................3
3.  Model Specification .......................................................8
Alternative Models ....................................................11
4.  Model Results ...........................................................14
Base Case Results ....................................................14
Sensitivity Analysis:  Impacts of Marketing Costs and Price Bounds ...............17





   1 Demand Data for 1991-92 Marketing Year ..................................9
   2 Base-Case Solution for Single-Desk Seller ..................................15
   3 Base-Case Solution for Multiple Seller Model ...............................15
   4 Base-Case Solution for Continental Barley Market Model ......................16
   5 Comparison of Welfare Measures in Three Models ............................16
   6 Sensitivity of Single-Desk Solution to Alternative Parameter Values ..............18
   7 Sensitivity of Continental Barley Market Solution to Alternative
Parameter Values .....................................................19
   8 Impact of Single-Desk Selling on U.S. Barley Imports .........................21
   9 Impact of Single-Desk Selling on U.S. Barley Prices ..........................22iii
List of Figures
Figure Page
   1 Harvested Barley Acres in Canada, 1979-98 ..................................4
   2 Canadian Barley Yields, 1979-98 ..........................................4
   3 Canadian Barley Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1979-98 .................5
   4 Changes in Canadian Barley Utilization .....................................5
   5 Domestic Feed Barley Price and Pool Returns, 1986-95 .........................7iv
Abstract
An optimization model is used to evaluate the implications of single-desk selling of
Canadian barley for trade flows and producer welfare.  Effects on U.S. imports and barley prices
are also considered.  
Key words:  barley, Canadian Wheat Board, grain trade.     v
Executive Summary
The Canadian Wheat Board markets all Canadian barley for human consumption (malting)
or export.  Single-desk selling by the CWB has been a contentious issue in Canada, as well as a
source of trade friction between Canada and the United States.   Within Canada, debate has
centered on whether single-desk selling works to the advantage of producers.  The CWB claims
to practice price discrimination in international barley markets and thereby raise average returns
for Canadian producers.  However, critics dispute the CWB’s ability to exert market power in
barley and point to various costs and inefficiencies associated with board control.  The role of the
CWB is also of interest to U.S. producers and policymakers, as Canada has exported increasing
amounts of barley to the United States in recent years.       
Most Canadian barley is consumed domestically as livestock feed and falls outside of
direct CWB control.  This makes the situation of barley somewhat different from that of wheat,
the other grain marketed by the CWB.  To attract barley into the price pooling system, the CWB
must offer a prospective return that is competitive with the domestic feed market.  Pool returns
are essentially weighted averages of CWB sale prices, with deductions for marketing and
transportation costs.            
This paper uses a quantitative model to examine the trade and welfare effects of single-
desk selling of Canadian barley.  The model, adapted from Schmitz et al. (1997), is developed
from the perspective of the CWB, which seeks to maximize board sales for three different types of
barley (feed, 2-row malting, and 6-row malting) within a single marketing year.  Revenues from
CWB sales are pooled by barley type.  Arbitrage conditions ensure that pool returns are at least as
great as the domestic feed barley price.  Barley demand is differentiated by type and region, and
the CWB is assumed to practice price discrimination.  Supply and demand parameters are
representative of the 1991/92 marketing year.      
The analysis is focused on two ongoing debates.  The first concerns the ability of the CWB
to extract additional revenue for Canadian producers through price discrimination in international
markets.  In the absence of the U.S. EEP program, which provided targeted export subsidies for
barley, there may be much less scope for differential pricing by the CWB.  This is an area of
sensitivity analysis in model simulations.  Bounds are placed on price spreads between regions; as
these are tightened, the potential gains from Canadian price discrimination are reduced.  The
second debate concerns the alleged ‘systemic inefficiencies’ associated with board control.  A
marketing cost parameter, representing the extra costs incurred by producers because of single-
desk selling, is varied in model simulations in order to illustrate the effects on trade flows and
welfare.  
Simulation results are reported for a range of parameter values, reflecting different
assessments of single-desk selling.  The base-case assumptions are most favorable to the CWB: no
binding constraints on price spreads, and no extra marketing costs associated with board sales. 
Under these assumptions, which are identical to those of Schmitz et al. (1997), single-desk selling
raises Canadian producer revenue by C$95.8 million relative to the multiple-seller (competitive)
solution.   However, under assumptions least favorable to the CWB —i.e., inability to price
discriminate and extra marketing costs of $C16/mt—Canadian producers lose C$160 millionvi
because of single-desk selling.  That is consistent with the view of critics of the CWB, notably
Carter and Loyns (1996), that Canadian producers would be better served by a competitive grain
marketing system.  Thus, conflicting views on single-desk selling are represented (or rationalized)
by different values of two key parameters: bounds on price spreads, and CWB marketing costs.     
From a U.S. perspective, an important question is whether single-desk selling has 
contributed to recent inflows of barley from Canada.  It would be unwise to read too much into
simulation results based one marketing year; however, the results are suggestive.  Given market
conditions in 1991/92, single-desk selling appears to have the effect of lowering U.S. feed barley
prices while raising U.S. malting barley prices.  If Canada were to adopt a competitive marketing
system for barley, results indicate, larger amounts of malting barley would be exported to the
United States. 
Some qualifications should be mentioned.  First, the analysis was restricted 1991/92, as
relevant data for other marketing years were not available.  Important changes have occurred in
recent years, including the growth of feed demand in western Canada, the suspension of U.S. EEP
subsidies for barley, and quality problems in the U.S. malting barley crop—all of which could be
expected to change price relationships and trade patterns.  Second, the model lacks the kind of
regional detail that may be critical to an understanding of continental barley trade.  Finally, while
the study focuses on single-desk selling, it should be recognized that other features of the
Canadian system have an important bearing on trade flows.  Among these are the regulations
concerning grain quality, grain transportation, and constraints on market access for U.S. grains in
Canada.  *Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State University,
Fargo.
1For discussion, see Johnson (1998).  
Single-Desk Selling of Canadian Barley:




The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) holds a pivotal position in Canada’s barley sector as
the organization responsible for selling all western-grown barley for malt or export.  The Board’s
single-desk seller status has been a contentious issue in Canada, as well as a source of trade
friction between Canada and the United States.  Most U.S. barley is grown in states contiguous to
the Prairie provinces.  This has drawn attention to stark differences in market organization on
either side of the border—differences that fuel, rightly or wrongly, U.S. concerns about ‘unfair’
Canadian practices.
1  Competition in U.S. markets ensures a continuous flow of price information
between buyers and sellers, leaving little doubt about the value of U.S. barley at a given time and
location.   Pricing is quite different in Canada.  Although  barley sold for domestic feed use is
priced competitively, the rest of Canadian barley (that controlled by the CWB) falls within a price-
pooling system.  The proceeds from CWB sales are pooled and, after deduction of marketing and
transportation costs, returned to producers after the close of a marketing year.  Effectively,
Canadian producers receive an average price for barley marketed by the CWB, with adjustments
for quality and distance from export points.  From a producer perspective, pooling masks the
‘true’ value of barley in individual sale transactions, and can lead to anomalous price spreads
between U.S. and Canadian barley.      
The price-pooling system is linked to one of the putative advantages of the Canadian
Wheat Board: its ability to practice price discrimination.  Because it is the single-desk seller of
barley for export or malting use, the CWB can offer different sale prices to different customers
and thereby raise net sales revenue.  (So claimed proponents of the CWB in advance of a 1997
plebiscite, in which Canadian barley producers were asked whether they wished to retain the
current system or allow open marketing for all barley.  The vote favored retention, but did not end
strident criticism of the system by many Canadian farmers.)  Pooling provides a mechanism for
producers to share in the proceeds of sales at different prices. 
Evidence supportive of the CWB was presented by Schmitz, et al. (1997).  That study
used a model of CWB barley marketing with price pooling to quantify the benefits of single-desk
selling.  Critics of the CWB, including Carter and Loyns (1996), question whether it is able to
exert market power in U.S. or offshore markets.  They also point to systemic inefficiencies in
grain marketing, handling, transportation and logistics that are  associated with CWB control;
these reduce net returns to Canadian producers and may outweigh any gains from price
discrimination.   2
From a U.S. perspective, an important question is whether single-desk selling or other
institutional factors have contributed to recent inflows of barley from Canada.   Politicians from
northern-tier states often blame the CWB for driving down U.S. prices, but it is not clear, a
priori, that the situation would improve if Canada liberalized its barley marketing system.  Indeed,
brief experience of  a ‘continental barley market’ in 1993 showed that exports to the United States
could increase if the CWB were no longer in control.   Economic theory suggests that, as price-
discriminating seller, the CWB could ‘undersell’ or ‘oversell’ (relative to a competitive
equilibrium) in individual markets, depending on the relevant elasticities of demand.  With the
U.S. barley market divided into ‘feed’ and ‘malting’ segments, and the latter divided into ‘6-
rowed’ and ‘2-rowed’ malting, it is not easy to guess the net effect of Canada’s single-desk selling
on U.S. imports or welfare. 
This paper uses a quantitative model to analyze welfare and trade issues associated with
single-desk selling.  The model, adapted from that of Schmitz et al. (1997), incorporates price
discrimination, price pooling, and a set of arbitrage conditions linking the pool to Canada’s
domestic feed barley market, which lies outside of CWB control.  Adaptations of the model are
focused on two ongoing debates.  The first concerns the ability of the CWB to practice price
discrimination.  Recent studies funded by the CWB, and making use of actual transaction data,
support the assertion that single-desk selling earns higher average returns (measured at port) for
Canadian grain producers, relative to a system with multiple sellers, because of price
discrimination (Kraft et al., and Schmitz et al. 1997).  However, much of the evidence is drawn
from years when the U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) was active.  That program, it may
be argued, made it possible, even necessary, for the Board to charge vastly different prices in
subsidized and unsubsidized markets.  In absence of EEP, the scope for differential pricing by the
CWB  may be substantially reduced.  This is an area of sensitivity analysis for model simulations.   
The second debate concerns what might be called ‘systemic inefficiencies’ associated with
single-desk selling.  Carter, Loyns, and Berwald (1998) argue that CWB control has contributed
to inflated costs of marketing, grain handling and logistics.  They estimate extra marketing costs
of approximately C$16 per metric ton for barley; this reduces the net price received by producers
and (they argue) more than offsets any benefit from single-desk selling.  This is a highly
contentious issue, partly because of disagreement about the Board’s responsibility for specific
costs (eg., high costs of elevation, grain cleaning, etc.) in the Canadian system.  To the extent that
extra marketing costs are associated with single-desk selling, that should be factored into an
analysis of trade and welfare effects.  The model presented here does so through inclusion of a
‘marketing cost differential,’ which is meant to reflect extra marketing costs associated with the
board system.  By varying this parameter, model simulations will illustrate the importance of cost
differentials for trade patterns and welfare.      
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section provides some background on
Canada’s barley sector and institutional arrangements.  The third section provides a complete
specification of the trade model.  Simulation results are presented in the fourth section.  The paper
concludes with a short summary and discussion of implications.
2.  Background on Canada’s Barley Sector2For perspective, U.S. barley acres averaged 8.3 million acres during the same period.    In the
mid-1980s, U.S. and Canadian barley acres were roughly the same; since then, U.S. acreage has been
trending downward.  U.S. harvested acres fell below 6 million in 1998. 
3Alberta Agriculture provides a useful summary of malting barley marketing in Canada. 
http://www.agric.gov.ab.ca/crops/barley/market02.html  
4These rates compare utilization of barley for malting purposes to total barley supply.  Using a
different measure, Johnson and Wilson (1994) estimated the availability of malting-quality barley by
region.  This varies with the proportion of acres planted to malting varieties (higher in Saskatchewan than
in Alberta).         
3
Barley has traditionally been one of the major crops grown in Canada’s western provinces,
with acreage exceeded only by wheat and (recently) canola.  Harvested acres have oscillated from
year to year (Figure 1), but averaged 11.2 million acres during the past two decades.
2    Barley
yields grew by 0.7 bushels/acre per year, on average, during the same period (Figure 2).  About
70 percent of total barley acreage is seeded to malting varieties, and the remaining 30 percent  is
seeded to varieties suitable for livestock feed only.  Malting barley acreage is divided between
two-row (two-thirds) and six-row varieties (one-third). (CWB, “Grains from Western Canada:
1997-98 Wheat and Barley,” p. 16).  Malt made from two-row varieties is preferred by most of
the world’s brewing industry, while malt from six-row varieties is more widely used in the United
States (Johnson and Wilson, 1994).   
Although most of Canada’s barley acreage is planted to malting varieties, only a small
fraction of production is sold for malting.  Farmers wishing to sell their barley for malting (and
earn higher pool returns) must submit a representative sample for evaluation by malt users
(domestic maltsters) or CWB-accredited exporters.  Samples are ‘selected’ for malting based on
quality factors, but standards may vary through time depending on the availability of high-quality
malting barley.
3  The overall selection rate (percentage accepted for malting) has averaged 11
percent in recent years; this compares to an average rate of 33 percent in the United States
(Schmitz and Koo, p. 29).
4  The Canadian Wheat Board controls the overall selection rate
through its marketing program by restricting the amount of malting barley available for export. 
Critics have questioned the ‘fairness’ of the selection process (which has been likened to a
lottery), and suggested that Canadian producers are losing potential export revenue (especially in
the United States) for malting barley.  
Canadian production, consumption, and exports of barley are shown in Figure 3.  In
general, barley exports have closely followed year-to-year changes in production.  However,
recent years have also seen a marked increase in domestic consumption.  This is the result of
increased livestock feeding, especially in Alberta.  With increased domestic consumption, smaller
portions of the barley crop are available for export.  Figure 4 compares exports with domestic
utilization (feed and non-feed) during two three-year periods: 1985-87 and 1995-97.  On average,
domestic feed use accounted for 55 percent of barley utilization in the earlier period, and 75





































Figure 1.  Harvested Barley Acres in Canada, 1979-98
Source: USDA/ERS.
Figure 2.  Canadian Barley Yields, 1979-98 
Source:  USDA/ERS.5






















































































Figure 3.  Canadian Barley Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1979-98
Figure 4.  Changes in Canadian Barley Utilization5Data are from the Canadian Grains Industry Statistical Handbook 97, p. 163.  Prices received by
farmers for non-board grains are not available for years after 1995.  
6The spread in 1995 was exceptionally high due to large premiums for Japanese sales early in the
year (CWB 1995-96 Annual Report, p. 29).  
6
Although domestic feed use is now far larger than the level of exports, the CWB has
continued to exert an influence on feed barley prices received by producers.   That is due to
arbitrage between board and non-board prices within Canada, and a lack of effective arbitrage
with external (primarily U.S.) feed markets.  Both points require some elaboration.  
Canadian producers can either sell their barley through the CWB for export or domestic
non-feed use, or in the domestic feed market; their choice depends on a comparison of
prospective returns.   In the case of pool returns, this is complicated by uncertainty about the
timing of delivery and size of final payment.  Producers who sell barley through the CWB must
first apply for a permit book.  This gives them the right to deliver under an acreage-based system
from the start of the crop year until after harvest; thereafter, they can contract to deliver grain
under one or more contract series (Series A, B, C, or D), which are staggered through the
marketing year.  The CWB issues delivery calls for contracted grain according to the requirements
of its marketing program.  Thus, producers are notified that some percentage of their contracted
grain should be delivered by a specified date.  Delivery calls are updated periodically based on sale
commitments and logistical needs.  It is also possible (although rare) for a contract series to
terminate before deliveries have reached 100%.  Upon delivery, producers receive an initial
payment.  Their final payment is received up to one-half year after the close of a marketing year,
after settlement of the pool accounts.  The final payment for a pool is unknown at the time of
contract sign-up, but can be estimated from the CWB’s own published forecasts.  Nevertheless,
selling barley through the CWB entails some additional risk and payment delays, which compare
unfavorably to selling opportunities in the domestic feed market.  In order to attract barley into
the pooling system (and away from domestic feed), the CWB needs to offer a return sufficient to
compensate producers for these extra costs.  Arbitrage pressures provide a linkage between board
and non-board prices for feed barley.  
Figure 5 compares barley pool returns to the average price received for non-board sales
(domestic feed) during 1986-95.  Pool returns are measured at port (Vancouver or Thunder Bay),
while the domestic feed price is a weighted average of interior locations.
5  Thus, transportation
costs account for part of the observed spread between the feed barley pool return and the
domestic feed barley price.  Other year-to-year variation in this spread is likely due the timing of
sales in individual marketing years.
6   Also shown are pool returns for select (malting) barley. 
Pool returns for malting barley were substantially higher than those for feed, especially in the late
1980s.  Two-row select barley earned consistently higher returns than six-row select.  7Carter (1993) and Schmitz et al. (1993) presented conflicting views on the continental barley
market.  Carter argued for market liberalization, while Schmitz et al. projected welfare losses for Canadian





















CWB Select 6 Row
CWB Select 2 Row
Figure 5.  Domestic Feed Barley Price and Pool Returns, 1986-95
Source:  Canadian Grains Council.
The single-desk authority of the CWB prevents direct arbitrage between external and
domestic markets.  As a result, Canadian barley prices bear no necessary relationship to prices in
contiguous regions of the United States.  This has been a source of frustration to growers who are 
positioned to ship barley directly into the United States—particularly during periods of high U.S.
prices.  Canada experimented with a ‘continental barley market’ in 1993, briefly removing the
CWB’s monopoly over North American sales.
7  This led to a surge of direct sales into the United
States by Canadian producers, demonstrating the powerful effects of cross-border  arbitrage in a
liberalized marketing system.  CWB control over barley was restored through court action in
1993 and confirmed by a producer plebiscite in 1997.  Barley exports to both U.S. and offshore
markets now seem likely to remain under CWB control, although debate continues within Canada
about the costs and benefits of single-desk selling.
        8As noted below, that is the only year for which complete data are available.   A limitation of the
following analysis is that it does not reflect current market conditions.  
9This estimate includes the direct cost of CWB administration ($1.75/mt), and costs due to
marketing inefficiency ($12.4 - 14.4/mt).  It does not include costs of delayed varietal development or
increased costs of farm management.  See Carter, Loyns and Berwald, p. 319.  
10For example, costs of handling and cleaning grain, grading standards, and variety licensing fall
within the purview of the Canadian Grain Commission.  However, there is a larger regulatory overlay for
board grains than for non-board grains. 
8
3.  Model Specification
 
The price-pooling model is a modified version of that presented by Schmitz et al. (1997). 
The model adopts the perspective of the Canadian Wheat Board, seeking to maximize board sales
revenue for three different types of barley (feed, 2-row malting, and 6-row malting) within a
single marketing year.  Revenues from CWB sales are pooled by barley type.  Arbitrage
conditions ensure that pool returns are at least as great as the domestic feed barley price.  Barley
demand is differentiated by type and region, and the CWB is assumed to practice price
discrimination.  Canadian barley supplies are taken as fixed, although quantities marketed by the
CWB are endogenous.  Supply and demand parameters are representative of the 1991/92
marketing year.
8   
Two modifications have been made to the model.  First, an upper bound (D) is placed on
price differences in CWB markets.  This is motivated by the claim by Carter (1993), among
others, that the CWB has limited ability to exert market power in international barley markets. 
Price discrimination by the CWB, in this view, was facilitated by the U.S. Export Enhancement
Program.   In the absence of EEP, it is questionable whether the CWB can charge substantially
different prices in different foreign markets.  By varying the size of the bound on price differences,
the model can be used to simulate varying degrees of market power. 
Second, a marketing cost parameter (M) has been introduced.  This is intended to reflect
higher costs of barley marketing associated with single-desk selling.  Carter, Loyns, and Berwald
(1998) have identified extra costs on the order of C$ 16/mt for barley.
9  This is disputed by the
Canadian Wheat Board (1996), and, indeed, not all of the costs and  inefficiencies identified by
Carter et al. are due strictly to single-desk selling.
10  However, to the extent that extra marketing
costs are borne by producers, the advantages of single-desk selling are diminished.  This will also
be illustrated through sensitivity analysis in model simulations.  
There are ten barley markets in the model, indexed by i.  Prices, quantities, and estimated
elasticities for the 1991-92 marketing year are shown in Table 1.  These were used to derive linear
demand parameters.  It should be noted that the elasticity estimates (with one exception) were not
based on econometric analysis;  rather, they were synthesized from a set of first-order conditions. 
Schmitz et al. assume that, as a price-discriminating monopolist, the CWB would allocate its sales
so as to equate marginal revenues across markets.  This is questionable, for reasons explained in
the appendix; however, the same demand elasticities are used in this study. 11Parameters are derived from information in Table 1.  The intercept is given by 
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0 Canada Domestic Feed 117.18 7,229 847 !0.53
1 Japan Feed 135.74 1,015 138 !3.69
2 United States Feed 106.73 143 15 !13.80
3 Rest of World Feed 104.21 1,336 139 !20.00
4 Canada Domestic 6-Row Malting 163.09 91 15 !1.96
5 United States 6-Row Malting 125.81 288 36 !2.74
6 Rest of World 6-Row Malting 127.39 83 11 !2.68
7 Canada Domestic 2-Row Malting 167.78 137 23 !1.91
8 United States 2-Row Malting 147.01 111 16 !2.19
9 Rest of World 2-Row Malting 138.93 804 112 !2.36
* Source: Schmitz et al. (1997), p. 32.  
The CWB seeks to maximize its sales revenue net of marketing costs.  Board net revenue
(BR), the objective function value, is defined as follows:
 
(1)
where pi is the price received (C$/mt) for sales in market i, qi is the quantity sold (‘000 mt), and M
is the unit marketing cost associated with board sales.  For simplicity, the same unit marketing
cost is assumed to apply in all CWB markets.  It should be emphasized that board net revenue,
not producer revenue, is the value to be maximized.  Board net revenue differs from total
producer revenue by p0q0, the revenue from domestic feed barley sales.  
Linear inverse demand schedules are specified for each market:
11 
(2)
For board markets (i = 1,2,...,9), prices are measured FOB at export points (Vancouver or
Thunder Bay).   The price for the domestic feed market (p0), by assumption, is also measured at12The domestic feed price in Table 1 is actually a weighted average of feed barley prices in export













(pi ! M)qi / y2&row
q0(p0 ! rfeed) $ 0
export points.
12   This allows arbitrage conditions to be specified without adjusting for spatial
price differences.  
There are three separate barley pool accounts.  Let yk denote the quantity of barley in a
pool account (k = ‘feed’, ‘6-row’, and ‘2-row’).  Thus, 
yfeed  = q1 + q2 + q3  
y6-row = q4 + q5 + q6  (3 a,b,c)
y2-row = q7 + q8 + q9  
 
Total barley supplies are divided between the three pools and the domestic feed market:
Q = yfeed + y6-row + y2-row + q0 (4)
where Q is the total quantity produced in a given year (11,238 thousand mt in simulations
reported below).  Returns to pool accounts are a weighted average of sale prices, with adjustment
for marketing costs:        
(5 a,b,c)
where rk  is the average return (C$/mt) for pool k.  
Two arbitrage conditions link the pool return for feed barley and the domestic feed barley
price.  Equation (5) ensures that if domestic feed sales are positive (q0 > 0), then the domestic
feed price is at least as great as the pool return.  
(6)
Equation (6) ensures that if barley is attracted into the feed pool (yfeed > 0), then the pool return is
at least as great as the domestic feed price.13According to Schmitz et al. (p. 33), the C$15/mt spread captures the average cost difference
between growing feed barley and growing malting barley.   This assumes that 2-row and 6-row malting
varieties would trade at the same premium to feed in a competitive market environment.  This is
questionable, given the larger premiums for 2-row varieties that have been observed historically.  
11
yfeed(rfeed ! p0) $ 0
pi ! pi ) # D ￿ i,i ) 0 k
(7)
In combination, (6) and (7) imply that if both quantities are positive, the domestic feed price
equals the pool return.  In that case, producers are indifferent between selling feed barley through
the CWB and selling it in the domestic feed market.  
  Finally, an upper bound is placed on price differences:
  (8)
where i and iN represent two markets in the same pool (either feed, 6-row, or 2-row malting). 
This bound may reflect arbitrage opportunities for international trading firms, or the existence of
substitutes for Canadian barley—either of which would limit the size of potential market
premiums.   For example, (8) ensures that the price of Canadian feed barley sold to Japan (a
‘premium’ market) does not exceed the price of feed barley sold to the United States or offshore
markets by more than D. 
The CWB’s optimization  problem can now be stated.  It is to maximize (1) subject to
constraints (2) through (8).  Note that if there are no additional marketing costs associated with
single-desk selling (M=0), and if the bound on price differences (D) is sufficiently large that
constraint (8) is non-binding for all relevant price pairs, then the model solution will be identical
to that of Schmitz et al. 
Alternative Models
For purposes of comparison, simulations will also be conducted with two alternative
models.  The first is what Schmitz et al. (1997) call the ‘multiple seller’ model, in which prices are
equalized across markets.  The multiple seller model represents a competitive market
environment.  This is posed as an optimization problem in which total producer revenue
(including revenue from domestic feed sales) is the value to be maximized.  Marketing costs are











qi(pi ! pi )) $ 0 ￿i,i ) 0 k
qi[pi ! (p0 % 15)] ’ 0 ￿i 0 {4,5,6,7,8,9}
RO ’ (p1 ! M)q1 % (p3 ! M)q3 % (p6 ! M)q6 % (p9 ! M)q9
Formally,  total revenue (TR) is maximized
(9)




Constraint (10) allocates all barley to ten markets.  Constraint (11) ensures that sales of a given
barley type (k) to market i are made only if there are no higher priced markets.  Constraint (12)
ensures that if malting barley is sold to market i, then it is priced at the domestic feed price plus a
fixed premium.  In combination, these constraints force the equalization of prices (either feed or
malting) in all markets where sales occur.  The ‘multiple seller’ solution provides a  natural
benchmark for the evaluation of trade and welfare effects.   
The second alternative represents the ‘continental barley market’.  This involves price
equalization in North America only, with the CWB retaining control over all offshore exports of
feed and malting barley.   The objective to be maximized is:
   
(13)
where RO denotes revenue from offshore markets.  The maximization is subject to demand
equations (2), and constraints (14) through (19):
  yfeed  = q1 + q3  
y6-row = q6  (14 a,b,c)
y2-row = q9  13
rfeed ’ [(p1 ! M)q1 % (p3 ! M)q3]/ yfeed
r6&row ’ (p6 ! M)
r2&row ’ (p9 ! M)
q0(p0 ! rfeed) $ 0
q4(p4 ! r6&row) $ 0
q7(p7 ! r2&row) $ 0
yfeed(rfeed ! p0) $ 0
y6&row(r6&row ! p4) $ 0
y2&row(r2&row ! p7) $ 0





p4 = p5 (19 a,b,c)
p7 = p8
In addition, for comparability with the single-desk seller model, an upper bound (D) is placed on
price differences between offshore and continental markets.  Along with the marketing cost
parameter (M), this will be varied in model simulations. 14For ease of comparison with Schmitz et al. (1997), all values are in expressed in Canadian
dollars.  The average exchange rate during the 1991/92 marketing year was 86 U.S. cents per Canadian
dollar.  
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4.  Model Results
The model results in this section divide into two parts.  First, results of base-case
simulations are shown.  These reflect specific parameter assumptions: no extra marketing costs
are attached to board sales (M = 0), and the bound on inter-market price differences is sufficiently
large (D = 40) that it is not constraining.  With these assumptions, results for the single-seller and
multiple-seller models are identical to those of Schmitz et al. (1997).  Second, results of sensitivity
analysis are shown. Values of marketing costs and price bounds are varied over a range so that
their joint impact on welfare, trade volume, and prices can be assessed.   
Base Case Results
Base-case results for the single-desk selling model are shown in Table 2.  This is the same
as the solution reported in Schmitz et al. (1997), p. 32.  Of Canada’s total barley supply, 7,229
thousand metric tons (64.3 %) are allocated to the domestic feed market, and the remainder (35.7
%) is sold by the CWB.  Price premiums are especially high for 2-row malting varieties.
14  Feed
barley prices are highest in Japan, and lowest in other offshore markets.  
Results of the multiple-seller (free-trade) model are shown in Table 3.  In this scenario, 
prices are equalized across markets and both types of malting barley are sold at a C$15/MT
premium to feed.  A larger quantity of barley, 7,487 thousand metric tons (66.7 % of total
supply), is sold on the domestic feed market.  This solution, representing a competitive market
equilibrium, provides a benchmark for comparison with other simulation results.  Interestingly,
total U.S. import volume (543 thousand MT) is virtually the same as under single-desk selling,
although there is a different distribution between feed and malting barley. 
 
Table 4 shows base-case results for the continental barley market.  In this scenario, board
sales are limited to offshore markets (Japan and rest-of-world), while prices are equalized in the
United States and Canada.   It turns out that, because of arbitrage constraints linking off-board 
prices to pool returns, prices of malting barley are the same in offshore markets and North
America.  However, different prices apply in offshore feed barley markets, with Japan continuing
to pay a small premium.  
Table 5 compares welfare measures for three models under base-case assumptions.  Total
net revenue for Canadian producers is highest under single-desk selling and lowest under the
multiple-seller model.  Under the continental barley market, producer net revenue is lower by
C$50 million (about 3 percent) due to the reduced opportunity for price discrimination.  In terms
of broader welfare measures, the differences between models are fairly small.  Canada, as an
exporter, experiences a net welfare gain due to single desk selling.  Welfare effects for the United
States reflect its position as an importer.  The United States shows a welfare gain in the multiple-
seller scenario because of larger sale volumes and lower prices, particularly for 2-row malting
barley.  However, as discussed below, a multiple-seller scenario would likely work to the
disadvantage of U.S. barley producers.15
Table 2.  Base-Case Solution for Single-Desk Seller
*
Canada United States Japan Rest-of-World
Quantity (‘000 MT)
Feed barley 7,229 143 1,014 1,336
6-row malting 91 288 0 83
2-row malting 137 111 0 805
Price (C$/MT)
Feed barley 117.2 106.7 135.8 104.2
6-row malting 163.1 125.8 - 127.4
2-row malting 167.8 147.0 - 138.9
Pool Accounts
Pool Quantity (‘000 MT) Pool Return (C$/MT)
Feed barley 2494 117.2
6-row malting 462 133.5
2-row malting 1053 143.5
*Assumes zero marketing cost differential (M=0) and no binding constraint on price differences (D=40).  
Model solution is identical to that of Schmitz et al. (1997), p. 32. 
Table 3.  Base-Case Solution for Multiple Seller Model
*
Canada United States Japan Rest-of-World
Quantity (‘000 MT)
Feed barley 7,487 96 1745 34
6-row malting 133 298 0 88
2-row malting 205 149 0 1,004
Price (C$/MT)
Feed barley 109.3 109.3 109.3 109.3
6-row malting 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3
2-row malting 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3
*Model solution is identical to that of Schmitz et al. (1997), p. 34. 16
Table 4.  Base-Case Solution for Continental Barley Market Model
*
Canada United States Japan Rest-of-World
Quantity (‘000 MT)
Feed barley 7,318 0 1508 670
6-row malting 128 265 0 79
2-row malting 197 140 0 933
Price (C$/MT)
Feed barley 114.5 114.5 117.9 106.8
6-row malting 129.5 129.5 - 129.5
2-row malting 129.5 129.5 - 129.5
Pool Accounts
Pool Quantity (‘000 MT) Pool Return (C$/MT)
Feed barley 2,178 114.5
6-row malting 79 129.5
2-row malting 933 129.5
*Assumes zero marketing cost differential (M=0) and no binding constraint on price differences (D=40).  
 
Table 5.  Comparison of Welfare Measures in Three Models
 
Model









Single-Desk Seller 505 847 1,352 2,161 10.9
Multiple Seller  - 1,256 1,256 2,135 14.0
Continental Barley Market 380 932 1,312 2,151 11.5
* For Canada, welfare is the sum of producer net revenue and consumer surplus.  For United States, 
   welfare is measured as area beneath import demand curve and above price, summed over three 
   barley types.   17
Sensitivity Analysis:  Impacts of Marketing Costs and Price Bounds
 Within Canada, much of the debate about single desk selling has concerned two issues:
the ability of the CWB to exert market power; and the systemic costs and inefficiencies associated
with board control.  To provide perspective on these issues, two model parameters are varied
incrementally.  The first is the bound on inter-market price differences (D), and the second is the
marketing cost parameter (M).   Different parameter values can be taken to represent different
views on the merits of single-desk selling.
Table 6 shows the impact of alternative values of M and D in the single-desk seller model. 
The upper panel shows the impact on Canadian producer revenue.  Revenue impacts are
expressed in terms of deviations from the multiple-seller solution.  Thus, when M=0 and D=40,
producer revenue is C$95.8 million higher with single-desk selling than under multiple sellers. 
These particular values correspond to Schmitz et al. (1997), and are most favorable to the single-
desk selling.  At the opposite (bottom right) corner of the panel are parameter values least
favorable to the CWB.  When M=16 and D=0, single-desk selling results in C$160 million lower
revenue relative to a competitive marketing system.   Values in the bottom right more closely
reflect the view of Carter and Loyns (1996); they point to higher costs of board marketing and
dispute the potential gains from price discrimination.
Other panels in Table 6 show the impacts of alternative parameter values on Canadian
welfare, U.S. welfare, and the CWB share of barley supply under single-desk selling.  Canadian
welfare is highest if the board has most pricing discretion (D=40) and no extra marketing costs
attach to the board system (M=0).  Canadian welfare is lowest if the board cannot price
discriminate (D=0) and marketing costs are high (M=16).  Differential impacts on U.S. welfare
are fairly small.   Results indicate that U.S. welfare is enhanced, to a small extent, by the board’s
ability to price discriminate—although net effects are still negative relative to the multiple sellers
scenario.   The bottom panel shows the proportion of Canadian barley marketed by the CWB,
given different parameter values.  This varies between 35.7 % (base case) and 28.7 %.   As
expected, with higher marketing costs and smaller bounds on price differences, smaller amounts
of barley enter the pooling system.      
Table 7 presents results of sensitivity analysis for the continental barley market.  As shown
in the upper panel, Canadian producer revenue is negatively related to both the marketing cost
parameter and the bound on price differences.  (For some combinations of high marketing costs
and low price bounds, model solutions were not feasible.)  A comparison of Tables 6 and 7
reveals that, for marketing costs above C$8/MT, the continental barley market generates higher
producer revenue than the single desk seller.  Impacts of the continental barley market on U.S.
welfare are mixed, depending on parameter values, but small in absolute magnitude.  18




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
 Canadian Producer Revenue: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 95.8 95.5 84.5 55.6 5.1
4 58.3 58.0 46.6 16.6 !36.1
8 21.1 20.8 9.0 !22.2 !77.4
12 !15.8 !16.1 !28.3 !60.8 !118.4
16 !52.4 !52.4 !65.3 !99.1 !160.0
 Canadian Welfare: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 25.9 26.4 25.6 20.7 10.5
4 12.1 12.6 11.8 !6.9 !3.2
8 !1.3 !0.8 !1.5 !6.3 !16.5
12 !14.2 !13.7 !14.5 !19.2 !29.3
16 !26.8 !26.3 !27.0 !31.7 !41.7
U.S. Welfare: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 !3.1 !3.4 !4.0 !4.9 !5.9
4 !3.3 !3.6 !4.2 !5.1 !6.1
8 !3.4 !3.7 !4.3 !5.3 !6.3
12 !3.6 !3.9 !4.5 !5.4 !6.5
16 !3.7 !4.0 !4.6 !5.6 !6.7
CWB Share of Total Barley Supply (%)
0 35.7 35.7 35.3 34.5 33.0
4 34.7 34.7 34.4 33.5 31.9
8 33.8 33.8 33.4 32.5 30.8
12 32.9 32.9 32.5 31.5 29.8
16 31.9 31.9 31.5 30.5 28.719




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
Canadian Producer Revenue: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 56.1 56.1 56.1 52.4 0.0
4 55.2 55.2 47.1 19.9  * 
8 26.7 26.5 16.4 !12.1  * 
12 !2.9 !3.1 !13.6  *   * 
16 !31.7 !31.9 !48.9  *   * 
Canadian Welfare: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 16.1 16.1 16.1 15.0  0.0 
4 15.2 15.2 12.8 4.9  * 
8 6.2 6.2 3.3 !4.7  * 
12 !2.8 !2.9 !5.8  *   * 
16 !11.4 !11.4 !16.0  *   * 
U.S. Welfare: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 !2.5 !2.5 !2.5 !2.3  * 
4 !2.5 !2.5 !2.1 !1.0  * 
8 !1.3 !1.3 !0.9 0.5  * 
12 0.0 0.0 0.6  *   * 
16 1.5 1.5 2.5  *   * 
CWB Share of Total Barley Supply (%)
0 28.4 28.4 28.4 28.2  * 
4 28.4 28.4 28.0 26.6  * 
8 27.0 27.0 26.5 25.0  * 
12 25.5 25.5 25.0  *   * 
16 24.1 24.1 23.3  *   * 
* Solution infeasible.15In this context, it should be noted that Canada now has fewer import barriers than in 1991/92, the
base year for model simulations.  The fact that most Canadian malt producers are  now owned, wholly or in
part, by U.S. parent companies may create additional pressure for lower malting barley prices in Canada.  
See Buschena, Gray, and Severson (1998) for discussion of integration in the North American malting
sector.   
16The magnitude of estimated price effects is influenced by assumptions underlying the multiple-
seller (competitive) scenario; particularly the C$15/mt spread between malting and feed barley.  To test the
importance of this assumption, an additional simulation was performed in which 2-row malting barley was
assumed to earn a C$30/mt premium to feed under multiple sellers.  Using this as the base for comparison,
simulation results for the single-desk selling model still show a net positive effect on U.S. malting prices.  
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Because the U.S. welfare measure is derived from import demand, it does not convey the
impact of Canadian barley trade on U.S. producers.  U.S. producer welfare cannot be directly
measured in the context of the present model, which does not explicitly include U.S. barley
supply.  However, the model does generate information relevant for an assessment of likely
welfare effects: import volumes, import values, and prices.  Impacts of single-desk selling on these
variables are shown in Tables 8 and 9.  
Table 8 shows the effects of single-desk selling on aggregate U.S. barley imports.  As
shown in the upper panel, import volumes are highest under base-case conditions (D=40 and
M=0).  Import volumes are lowest when price differences are minimized and marketing costs are
highest (D=0 and M=16).   The negative relationship between marketing cost and U.S. import
volume is not unexpected: higher marketing costs reduce CWB sales generally, and not just in the
United States.  It is less obvious why the bound on price differences is positively related to U.S.
barley imports.  The explanation lies in inter-market price spreads, especially for malting barley. 
U.S. malting barley prices are substantially lower than Canada’s in the base case, and a narrowing
of price spreads (lower value of D) requires withholding malting barley from the lower-priced
market.
15   It is worth emphasizing that while single-desk selling has little impact on total U.S.
import volume under base-case assumptions, the effect is to reduce U.S. imports if extra
marketing costs are associated with board sales.
Additional detail on price effects can be found in Table 9.  As shown in the upper panel, 
single-desk selling tends to lower the U.S. feed barley price.  The impact is most pronounced for
base-case parameter values (D=40, M=0).  On the other hand, as shown in the middle and lower
panels, U.S. malting barley prices are higher as a result of Canada’s single-desk selling—and
substantially so in the case of 2-row malting barley.  This suggests that the CWB withholds
malting barley from the U.S. market, thereby raising the price above what would be observed in a
multiple seller environment.
16   The estimated price impacts vary with parameter assumptions.  As
the marketing cost parameter increases, so does the U.S. barley price.  
These results provide a mixed message for U.S. producers.  While single-desk selling by
Canada appears to lower the U.S. feed barley price, it may also raise the U.S. malting barley price
by restraining trade flows that would otherwise occur.  And whatever the level of extra marketing
costs associated with single desk selling (and absorbed by Canadian producers), their impact on
U.S. barley prices is generally positive.      21




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
U.S. Barley Import Volume: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (‘000 MT)
0 0.1 !6.8 !20.8 !44.2 !83.4
4 !8.4 !15.3 !29.4 !53.4 !93.9
8 !16.8 !23.7 !37.9 !62.4 !104.4
12 !25.0 !31.9 !46.3 !71.3 !115.0
16 !33.0 !39.9 !54.5 !80.0 !125.5
U.S. Average Barley Import Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 3.5 4.1 5.1 6.9 9.5
4 4.0 4.6 5.7 7.5 10.2
8 4.5 5.1 6.2 8.1 11.0
12 5.0 5.6 6.7 8.7 11.7
16 5.5 6.1 7.2 9.3 12.5
U.S. Barley Import Value: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 1.9 1.3 !0.2 !1.9 !5.8
4 1.1 0.5 !0.7 !2.8 !6.6
8 0.3 !0.3 !1.5 !3.7 !7.9
12 !0.5 !1.0 !2.3 !4.6 !9.0
16 !1.2 !1.8 !3.1 !5.5 !10.022




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
U.S. Feed Barley Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 !2.6 !2.6 !2.5 !2.3 !1.5
4 !2.2 !2.2 !2.2 !2.0 !1.1
8 !1.9 !1.9 !1.9 !1.6 !0.8
12 !1.6 !1.6 !1.6 !1.3 !0.4
16 !1.3 !1.3 !1.3 !1.0 !0.1
U.S. 6-Row Malting Barley Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 1.5 2.6 4.5 7.2 11.5
4 1.8 2.9 4.8 7.6 12.0
8 2.1 3.2 5.1 8.0 12.6
12 2.4 3.5 5.4 8.3 13.1
16 2.7 3.8 5.7 8.6 13.6
U.S. 2-Row Malting Barley Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 22.8 22.8 23.3 24.9 23.3
4 23.1 23.1 23.6 25.2 23.8
8 23.4 23.4 23.9 25.6 24.3
12 23.6 23.7 24.2 25.9 24.8
16 23.9 23.9 24.5 26.2 25.323
5.  Conclusion
The role of the Canadian Wheat Board in the barley sector has been the subject of much
analysis and debate in Canada.  Some western growers, particularly in Alberta, have objected to
the disproportionate influence of the CWB on feed barley prices, and the lack of effective
arbitrage between U.S. and Canadian markets.  About three quarters of Canadian barley is now 
utilized domestically as livestock feed, which renders the CWB something of a residual claimant. 
Yet so long as Canada remains a surplus producer of feed barley, prospective pool returns will 
affect values in the Canadian feed market. Single-desk selling and price pooling mean that
Canadian barley values are disconnected from those in contiguous U.S. markets. 
One of the purported advantages of the CWB is its ability to earn higher returns for
malting barley compared to a multiple-seller environment.  Schmitz et al. (1997) quantified the
impact of single-desk selling on average prices received for malting barley: C$42/MT for 6-row
varieties, and C$34/MT for 2-row varieties, based on model simulations for ten marketing years. 
Other studies, notably Carter (1993), have pointed to the low Canadian selection rates for malting
barley, and questioned whether Canadian producers would be better served by a deregulated
marketing system.   In Carter’s view, higher premiums for malting barley must be weighed against
the cost of lost marketing opportunities, particularly in the United States. 
Among economists, much of the debate about single-desk selling has revolved around two
issues.  The first concerns the ability of the CWB to exert market power and extract price
premiums for Canadian barley in export markets.  Carter (1993), for example, found demand for
Canadian barley to be extremely elastic in major offshore markets.  This would undermine the
ability of the CWB to act a price discriminating monopolist.  Schmitz et al. (1997) presented some
empirical evidence on differences in CWB export prices.  They found significant differences in fob
prices paid for feed barley in Japan, the United States, and the rest of the world, lending support
to the claim of CWB price discrimination.  However, their results were strongest for the period
when the U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) was in effect.   In the absence of targeted
subsidies by competing exporters, the ability of the CWB to charge different prices in different
markets may be severely circumscribed.  
The second debate concerns the issue of systemic costs associated with single-desk selling. 
Carter and Loyns (1996), and Carter, Loyns and Berwald (1998) have identified numerous extra
costs in the Canadian grain handling, transportation, and marketing system which, they argue, are
directly or indirectly linked to the Canadian Wheat Board.  Higher marketing costs—possibly as
high as C$16/MT for barley— would lower the net return to Canadian producers and offset any
advantages of single-desk selling.  Defenders of the CWB dispute these estimates and the Board’s
responsibility for specific costs and inefficiencies.  There may be no way to resolve this debate
short of major reforms in the Canadian system. 
These questions are of keen interest to U.S. producers and policymakers.  Canadian barley
exports to the United States have risen in recent years relative to historical averages, while U.S.
barley acres have declined.  It is natural to ask what effect single-desk selling of Canadian barley
has had on U.S. barley prices.  Northern-tier politicians have argued that the Canadian Wheat
Board, as a state trading enterprise (STE), enjoys an unfair competitive advantage in U.S. and
international markets.  Their presumption is that the CWB must therefore work to the
disadvantage of U.S. producers.  But the brief experience of a ‘continental barley market’ in 199317See Johnson and Wilson (1994) for a more fully developed spatial model based on competitive
market equilibrium.    
24
may have shown the opposite, as the suspension of CWB control allowed large volumes of
Canadian barley to move south in response to price differentials.  While the 1993/94 surge in U.S.
barley imports was partly due to a short corn crop, it seems plausible that a competitive marketing
system in Canada would actually facilitate exports to the United States.  
The analysis in this paper is based on a model of single-desk selling by the Canadian
Wheat Board.   The model, adapted from that of  Schmitz et al. (1997), includes both feed and
malting barley, ten distinct markets, price pooling, and a set of arbitrage conditions linking pool
returns to the domestic feed barley price.  The model includes two additional features—a bound
on inter-market price differences (D), and a marketing cost parameter (M)— which allow the
diverse opinions on single-desk selling to be represented analytically.   The benchmark for
comparison is a ‘multiple seller’ model, in which prices are equalized (fob Canadian ports) across
markets for each type of barley.   Comparisons are also made to a ‘continental barley market’
model.  Demand and supply estimates are based on the 1991/92 marketing year.  
Results of the analysis may be summarized as follows.  Under base-case assumptions,
which are most favorable to the CWB (i.e., D=40 and M=0), single-desk selling of Canadian
barley raises Canadian producer revenue by C$95.8 million, relative to the multiple-seller solution. 
However, if tighter bounds apply to price differences or extra marketing costs apply, the effect of
single-desk selling is to lower Canadian producer revenue.  Under parameter values least
favorable to the CWB (D=0 and M=16), Canadian producers lose C$160.0 million because of
single-desk selling.     
Under base-case assumptions, the continental barley market generates lower net revenue
for Canadian producers than single-desk selling.  However, the continental barley market
compares favorably to single-desk selling (in terms of Canadian revenue) if extra marketing costs
of at least C$8/MT apply to board sales.  
Impacts of single-desk selling on U.S. producers cannot be estimated directly from model
results because U.S. supplies are not explicitly included in the analysis.  However, the price effects
of different scenarios are suggestive.  Given market conditions for the base year, single-desk
selling in Canada appears to have the effect of lowering U.S. feed barley prices while raising U.S.
malting barley prices—both 6-row and (especially) 2-row varieties.   This suggests that if Canada
were to adopt a competitive marketing system for barley, larger amounts of malting barley would
be exported to the United States.  Based on sensitivity analysis, if marketing costs in Canada are
inflated by single-desk selling, this would also lend some support to U.S. price levels.    
Some qualifications should be mentioned.  First, the analysis is based on results for one
marketing year, as relevant data for other years (i.e., average CWB transaction prices and
quantities, by market) were not available.  Important changes have occurred in recent years,
including the growth of feed demand in western Canada, the suspension of U.S. EEP subsidies for
barley, and quality problems in the U.S. malting barley crop—all of which could be expected to
change price relationships and trade patterns.  Second, the model lacks the kind of regional detail
that may be critical to an understanding of continental barley trade.
17  Canadian feed barley18These issues were examined by the Canada-United States Joint Commission on Grains.  For more
background on reciprocal market access, see Wilson and Dahl (1998). 
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demand is centered in Lethbridge, while California represents the largest U.S. feed market.  U.S.
malting capacity is spatially dispersed, but with a concentration of plants in the Midwest.  With or
without the CWB, flows of Canadian barley into U.S. markets are likely to be determined by the
costs of inter-regional grain movements, in addition to price spreads at Canadian ports.  
While this study has focused on single-desk selling, it should also be recognized that other
features of the Canadian system have an important bearing on trade flows.  Among these are the
regulations concerning grain quality, and constraints on market access for U.S. grains in Canada.
18 
Some prospective policy changes—such as deregulation of Canadian rail rates for grain—could
have significant long-term effects on continental barley trade.  These issues, which may be only
indirectly linked to Canadian Wheat Board, also warrant attention from U.S. analysts and
policymakers.26
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(a1 ! b1q1) ! (a2 ! b2q2) # D
(a2 ! b2q2) ! (a1 ! b1q1) # D
max L ’ a1q1 ! b1q
2
1 % a2q2 ! b2q
2
2
% 81[D ! (a1 ! b1q1) % (a2 ! b2q2)]
% 82[D ! (a2 ! b2q2) % (a1 ! b2q1)]
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’ a2 ! 2b2q2 % 82b2 ! 81b2 # 0
Appendix
In the standard model of a price discriminating monopolist, profits are maximized by
equating marginal revenues across markets (e.g., Henderson and Quandt, pp. 182-3).  However,
when the price difference between markets is limited—for example, by opportunities for trader
arbitrage—this condition no longer holds.  Following is a demonstration that marginal revenues
for the monopolist are not, in general, equalized across markets when there is a binding constraint
on price differences.
Consider a two market problem.  A monopolist faces inverse demand functions of the
form  pi = ai ! bi qi   (i = 1,2) and seeks to maximize revenue.
19   An upper bound, D,  is placed on
price differences.   This might reflect the transaction cost for firms engaged in arbitrage between
the two markets.  The monopolist’s problem is:
or in lagrangian form,
The first-order conditions are equations (1) through (8): 
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Assume that q1 > 0 and q2 > 0.   Then (1) and (3) are equalities, by complementary slackness
conditions (2) and (4).    Rearrange (1) to obtain
(9)
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2D % a1 ! a2
2(b2 % b1)
Now assume that p2 ! p1 = D, so that (7) holds as an equality.  Then (5) is a strict inequality, and
81 = 0 by the complementary slackness condition (6).  Combining 81 = 0 with (9), we obtain
(11)
Combining 81 = 0 with (10), we obtain
(12)
Substitute (11) and (12) into (7) (treated as equality)
(13)
and rearrange to solve for 82:
 
(14)
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2D % a1 ! a2
2(b2 % b1)
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2D % a1 ! a2
2(b2 % b1)
’
!2b2D ! b2(a2 ! a1)
b2 % b1
!2b1D ! b1(a1 ! a2) ’ !2b2D !b2(a2 ! a1)
D ’




Similarly, marginal revenue in market 2 is 
(18)
If marginal revenues in the two markets are equalized, then it must be true that
or rearranging terms,
(19)
Thus, if  p2 ! p1 = D, marginal revenues are equalized only in the special case that demand
parameters satisfy (19).   
The implication is that, if price spreads are constrained (e.g., by the presence of
arbitragers, or availability of substitutes), a monopolist will not, in general, equate marginal
revenues in different markets.  This prompts two observations about Canadian barley and the
price pooling model.  First, price-setting by the CWB has surely been subject to constraints of this32
kind.  In years when the U.S. EEP program was in effect, the CWB exported barley to both
subsidized and unsubsidized markets.  Price spreads between those markets, corrected for
shipping cost differentials, were bounded by the size of EEP bonuses—something over which the
CWB had no control.  The second point concerns the price-pooling model of Schmitz et al.
(1997).  Demand parameters in that model were synthesized from a mixture of elasticities, CWB
sales data, and first-order conditions from the single-desk seller’s optimization problem.  Those
first-order conditions include equalization of marginal revenues across markets.  Thus, the
demand parameters reflect a dubious assumption: that CWB price differentials are not constrained
by competitive conditions or subsidies of foreign suppliers.  This suggests that the estimated net
benefits of single-desk selling may be overstated for reasons unrelated to the debate over systemic
costs.  